and Stevens, at the time of PM, Russell holds that predicates and relations are, like particulars, 'individuals'. 2 Further, they hold that in PM, 'proposition' and 'propositional function' should be read as '(closed) sentence ' and 'open sentence', respectively. 3 To accommodate this reading of 'individual', on the one side, and 'proposition' and 'propositional function', on the other, Landini has argued that in PM, there are two styles of variable: 'individual variables', which are understood 'objectually', and which, in accord with an un-typed metaphysics, are absolutely unrestricted and take absolutely all entities, including all particulars and predicates and relations, as their values; and higher-order variables, which are understood 'substitutionally' (in the contemporary sense).
4 Thus, 'predicate variables' are understood as 'dummy schematic letters' which are to be replaced by open sentences -that is to say, propositional functions understood as mere linguistic items -while propositional variables (to the extent they are used in PM) are likewise 'dummy schematic letters' to be replaced by (closed) sentences. That is, there is no quantification over propositions or propositional functions, understood as the ontological correlates of sentences, closed and open, respectively.
At key points in defending this interpretation of PM, Landini emphasizes aspects of the multiple-relation theory of judgment (MRTJ) and the role it plays in the 'Introduction' -specifically, Chapter II ('The Theory of Logical Types'), Section III ('Definition and Systematic Ambiguity of Truth and Falsehood') -of PM. Thus, for example, in justifying his view that in PM, 'proposition' should be read as 'sentence' or 'well-formed formula', Landini writes:
Principia has explicitly abandoned an ontology of propositions (PM, p. 44) . When Whitehead and Russell use the term 'proposition' they must mean 'well-formed formula '. (1998a: 258) And in justifying his interpretation of 'propositional function', he writes:
Since there are no propositions in an ontological sense, it seems clear that a propositional function is just an open wff. (1998a: 277) The reference here to PM in the first of these passages is to the discussion of the MRTJ, in the course of which Whitehead and Russell write:
